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The manner in which conflicts between Aboriginal title to land and
private third-party interests should be dealt with is a major issue in
Canadian law and policy. The matter came up at trial in Tsilhqot'in
Nation v. British Columbia, and again was left unresolved. However,
Justice Vickers did acknowledge the vital importance of the issue and
the need to reconcile these conflicting interests through honourable
negotiations. While admitting that a courtroom is not the appropriate
forum for achieving reconciliation,he provided detailedanalysis of the
applicable legal principles and insights into the public policy considerations that should guide the negotiations.
This article examines these aspects of Justice Vickers'judgment
and suggests more specific ways in which Aboriginal title and thirdparty interests might be reconciledthrough the process of negotiation.
It proposes a context-based approachthat seeks to redress the historical injustice of the wrongful taking ofAboriginallands, without disregarding the current interests of innocent thirdparties. The monetary
costs of reconciliation,it is argued,should be borne by the real wrongdoers, namely the provincialand Canadiangovernments.
Kent McNeil is distinguished research professor at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto.
The author would like to thank Ryan White for his valuable research assistance with this article,
and Kathy Simo, Brian Slattery and Kerry Wilkins for their insightful comments on a draft.
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[T]his judgment features Tsilhqot'in people as they strive to assert their place as
First Peoples within the fabric of Canada's multi-cultural society. The richness
of their language, the story of their long history on this continent, the wisdom of
their oral traditions and the strength and depth of their characters are a significant
contribution to our society. Tsilhqot'in people have survived despite centuries of
colonization. The central question is whether Canadians can meet the challenges
of decolonization.
Mr. Justice David H. Vickers, Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British Columbia1
There can be little doubt that Tsilhqot'inNation v. British Columbiais the most
significant Aboriginal title case to be decided in Canada since Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia.' Like Delgamuukw, it arose from a claim to Aboriginal title
over a large area in the interior of British Columbia, resulting in a prolonged
and complex trial.3 The Tsilhqot'in people commenced the legal proceedings
after the provincial government in the 1980s authorized logging activities
within their traditional territory in the Cariboo-Chicotin region, lying between
the City of Williams Lake and the crest of the Pacific Range of mountains to
the west. The Tsilhqot'in people, many of whom lacked adequate housing and
employment, were frustrated and angry that timber was being removed from
their lands without their consent and without economic benefits to their communities. They sought a declaration of Aboriginal title to the claim area, and
of Aboriginal rights to hunt and trap birds and animals, capture wild horses,
and trade in furs and other animal products to obtain a moderate livelihood.
Like the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw, the
trial decision in Tsilhqot'in Nation did not resolve the Aboriginal title claim.
While declaring that the Tsilhqot'in people have the other specified Aboriginal rights throughout the claim area, Justice Vickers decided that a declaration
of title could not be issued because the pleadings had framed the case as an
"all or nothing" claim over the entire claim area, and title to the whole area
had not been established by the evidence. He said it would be prejudicial to
the defendants (the Crown in right of British Columbia and Canada) "[t]o al4
low the plaintiff to now seek declarations over portions of the Claim Area."
1 2007 BCSC 1700, [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 112 at para. 20 [Tsilhqot'inNation]. Note that all three parties (the Tsilhqot'in Nation, British Columbia and Canada) filed notices of appeal from Justice
Vickers' judgment, and then a year was spent trying to negotiate a settlement. Concluding that
insufficient progress had been made in the settlement discussions, British Columbia and Canada
applied to have the stay of proceedings order lifted and this application was granted on February
26, 2009, in William v. British Columbia, [2009] 2 C.N.L.R. 385 (B.C.C.A.), allowing the appeal
to proceed.
2 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw].
3 The trial in Tsilhqot'in Nation took 339 days, stretching over almost four and a half years, and
involved evidence "in the fields of archeology, anthropology, history, cartography, hydrology,
wildlife ecology, ethnoecology, ethnobotany, biology, linguistics, forestry and forest ecology":
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at ii (C.N.L.R. 119).
4 Ibid. at para. 129.
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Justice Vickers nonetheless found that Aboriginal title had been established
over a large area, both inside and outside the claim area, and offered his opinion that the plaintiff would have been entitled to a declaration of title had the
case been properly pleaded. He wrote a lengthy judgment explaining the basis
for this opinion, and dealing with a variety of other issues, such as constitutional authority over Aboriginal title lands, infringement of Aboriginal title,
Tsilhqot'in Aboriginal rights apart from title, and limitations of actions.
While the defect in the pleadings may have been a valid legal reason for
denying a declaration of Aboriginal title, one has to wonder why this matter
was not identified earlier and resolved through amendment.5 Why spend four
and a half years in a courtroom, with all the attendant effort and expense, to
arrive at an inconclusive result? If there is a judicial explanation for this, 6 it
may lie in Justice Vickers' realization that a court is not the appropriate venue
for achieving justice through reconciliation of the rights ofAboriginal peoples
with the interests of Canadian society generally. This article will analyze this
aspect of his decision, paying particular attention to inevitable conflicts between Aboriginal title and third-party interests, and suggest ways of reconciling these interests though the process of negotiations.

I

Aboriginal Title and Reconciliation

In a lengthy section on "Reconciliation" at the end of his judgment in
Tsilhqot'inNation, Justice Vickers was quite explicit about the limited capacity of courts to resolve claims of this nature. He wrote:
In an ideal world, the process of reconciliation would take place outside the adversarial milieu of a courtroom. This case demonstrates how the Court, confined
by the issues raised in the pleadings and the jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights
and title, is ill equipped to effect a reconciliation of competing interests. That
must be reserved for a treaty negotiation process. Despite this fact, the question
remains: how can this Court participate in the process of reconciliation between
Tsilhqot'in people, Canada and British Columbia in these proceedings?7

5
6

7

A post-judgment amendment was sought by the plaintiffs, but refused by Vickers J. because to
allow it "at this point would be unfair and prejudicial to the defendants": Tsilhqot'in Nation v.
British Columbia,2008 BCSC 600, at para. 13.
In saying this, I do not intend to blame Justice Vickers. Early on, he tried to get defence counsel
to admit Tsilhqot'in occupation (this probably would have avoided the pleading issue), without
avail: "I confess that early in this trial, perhaps in a moment of self-pity, I looked out at the
legions of counsel and asked if someone would soon be standing up to admit that Tsilhqot'in
people had been in the Claim Area for over 200 years, leaving the real question to be answered.
My view at this early stage of the trial was that the real question concerned the consequences that
would follow such an admission. I was assured that it was necessary to continue the course we
were set upon. My view has not been altered since I first raised the issue almost five years ago."
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1373.
Ibid. at para. 1357.
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Given that Canada's adversarial judicial system is designed "to produce a
win/lose result,"8 Justice Vickers was acutely aware of the next-to-impossible
task facing judges who are asked to achieve reconciliation by balancing historical Aboriginal rights and contemporary interests. Recognizing that "the
actions of courts have the potential to diminish the possibility of reconciliation ever occurring,"9 he quoted the following passage from a recent article by
Professor Brian Slattery:
... the successful settlement of aboriginal claims must involve the full and unstinting recognition of the historical reality of aboriginal title, the true scope
and effects of Indigenous dispossession, and the continuing links between an
Indigenouspeople and its traditionallands. So, for example, to maintain that

"nomadic" or "semi-nomadic" peoples had historical aboriginal title to only
a fraction of their ancestral hunting territories, or to hold that aboriginal title
could be extinguished simply by Crown grant, is to rub salt into open wounds.

However, by the same token, the recognition of historicaltitle, while a necessary preconditionfor modern reconciliation,is not in itself a sufficient basisfor
reconciliation, which must take into account a range of other factors. So, for

example, to suggest that historical aboriginal title gives rise to modem rights
that automatically trump third party and public interests constitutes an attempt to
remedy one grave injustice by committing another. 10
With evident frustration, Justice Vickers observed:
Courts should not be placed in this invidious position merely because governments at all levels, for successive generations, have failed in the discharge of
their constitutional obligations. Inevitably this decision and others like it run the
risk of rubbing salt into open wounds.
The constitutional obligations Justice Vickers seems to have had in mind
were the obligation of Canada to play a central role in Aboriginal affairs and
negotiate treaties, and the obligation of British Columbia not to appropriate
Aboriginal lands or grant third-party interests in relation thereto before Aboriginal title had been dealt with by treaty. 2 The "invidious position" courts
have been placed in as a result of these failures is this: when claims such as
this come to court, judges are faced with the task of trying to achieve reconciliation of the competing interests so plainly identified by Slattery, but are unable to do so, given the constraints of the law and the inappropriate adversarial
context in which judges are obliged to make their decisions.

8 Ibid. at para. 1360.
9 Ibid. at para. 1367.
10 Ibid., quoting Brian Slattery, "The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title" (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev.
255 at 282 (Slattery's italics; footnotes omitted).
11 Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1368.
12 See ibid.at paras. 1045-49.
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So Justice Vickers' message to the parties seems to be that Professor Slattery is right about what is needed, but that the courts cannot deliver because
reconciliation can only be achieved through negotiation, not litigation. 3 Justice Vickers found support for this conclusion in recent Supreme Court of
Canada jurisprudence. He acknowledged that the Supreme Court has determined that the purpose behind the recognition and affirmation of Aboriginal rights by s. 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 198214 is reconciliation of the
Aboriginal peoples' prior occupation of Canada with the Crown's assertion
of sovereignty.15 But he also distinguished between the meaning assigned to
reconciliation by the late Chief Justice Antonio Lamer, who first identified
this purpose in R. v. Van der Peet,16 and the views of the current Chief Justice,
Beverley McLachlin, who dissented in that case.17 In R. v. Gladstone, 8 Chief
Justice Lamer used the concept of reconciliation to broaden the legislative
objectives that could justify infringements of Aboriginal rights. 9 Obviously
preferring the views of Justice McLachlin (as she then was), Justice Vickers
observed that the result of Chief Justice Lamer's approach
...
is that the interests of the broader Canadian community, as opposed to the
constitutionally entrenched rights of Aboriginal peoples, are to be foremost in
the consideration of the Court. In that type of analysis, reconciliation does not
focus on the historical injustices suffered by Aboriginal peoples. It is reconcilia2
tion on terms imposed by the needs of the colonizer.
After noting that Lamer C.J. "expanded the list ofjustifiable infringements of
Aboriginal title" in Delgamuukw,2 Justice Vickers quoted from McLachlin
C.J.'s unanimous judgment in HaidaNation v. British Columbia (Ministerof
Forests),22 where "she revisited her vision of reconciliation through negoti23
ated settlements":

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23

See also ibid.at para. 1370, where he referred to Professor Slattery's "principles of recognition,"
before stating at para. 1371: "This is, of course, not a task for a court. However, in the context of
treaty negotiation, it strikes me as a convenient starting point."
Schedule B to the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at paras. 1345-47, referring especially to R. v. Van der Peet,
[1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 [Van der Peet], and R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 [Gladstone].
Van der Peet, supranote 15.
See also Kent McNeil, "Reconciliation and the Supreme Court: The Opposing Views of Chief
Justices Lamer and McLachlin" (2003) 2 Indigenous L.J. 1.
Gladstone, supranote 15.
See Kent McNeil, "How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples
Be Justified?" (1997) 8:2 Constitutional Forum 33, also in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice?
Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canadaand Australia(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 2001) 281 [EmergingJustice?].
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1at para. 1350.
Ibid. at para. 1352, referring to Delgamuukw, supranote 2.
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [HaidaNation].
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1at para. 1353.
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Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with assumed
Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights guaranteed by s. 35 of the
ConstitutionAct, 1982. Section 35 represents a promise of rights recognition and
"[i]t is always assumed that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises" (Badger
supra, at para. 41). This promise is realized and sovereignty claims reconciled
through the process of honourable negotiation. It is a corollary of s. 35 that the
Crown act honourably in defining the rights it guarantees and in reconciling them
with other rights and interests. This, in turn, implies a duty to consult and, if appropriate, accommodate. 4
Justice Vickers obviously took solace in the shift in HaidaNation from
reconciliation through justifiable infringement to reconciliation through negotiated settlements, but that did not resolve his dilemma. One gets a sense
of his angst in the following passage, which introduces his discussion of
reconciliation:
Throughout the course of the trial and over the long months of preparing this
judgment, my consistent hope has been that, whatever the outcome, it would
ultimately lead to an early and honourable reconciliation with Tsilhqot'in people.
After a trial of this scope and duration, it would be tragic if reconciliation with
Tsilhqot'in people were postponed through seemingly endless appeals. The time
25
to reach an honourable resolution and reconciliation is with us today.
So what is a judge in his position to do? Justice Vickers said he had
"come to see the Court's role as one step in the process of reconciliation. ' 26
He continued:
For that reason, I have taken the opportunity to decide issues that did not need to
be decided. For example, I have been unable to make a declaration of Tsilhqot'in
Aboriginal title. However, I have expressed an opinion that the parties are free to
1
use in the negotiations that must follow.
This brings us back to his refusal to issue a declaration of Aboriginal
title. While the pleadings provided a convenient justification for this refusal, I
think he could have gotten around this problem if he had thought a declaration
was not only warranted, but also appropriate. In my respectful opinion, he
refused the declaration because it would not have been the appropriate means
for arriving at the reconciliation that he acknowledged could be achieved only
24
25
26
27

HaidaNation,supranote 22 atpara. 20, quoted in Tsilhqot'inNation, supranote I atpara. 1353.
The reference is to X v. Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 [Badger].
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1at para. 1338.
Ibid. at para. 1375.
Ibid. Consequently, in British Columbia (Ministerof Forests)v. OkanaganIndian Band, [2008]
3 C.N.L.R. 87 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 18 [Okanagan Indian Band], Mackenzie J.A., in upholding
an order for severance of Aboriginal title and Aboriginal rights issues in connection with the
harvesting of timber by members of the Okanagan Indian Band, described the Aboriginal title
portion of Vickers J. 's judgment in Tsilhqot'in Nation as "admittedly obiter dicta." See also per
Donald J.A. (dissenting) at para. 53.
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through negotiations. His purpose in writing a lengthy judgment that, in his
words, "decide[d] issues that did not need to be decided," was to force Canada
and British Columbia to modify their views on Aboriginal title, and push the
parties into honourable negotiations that would result in genuine reconciliation, a goal unattainable in court. He wrote:
What is clear to me is that the impoverished view ofAboriginal title advanced by
Canada and British Columbia, characterized by the plaintiff as a "postage stamp"
approach to title, cannot be allowed to pervade and inhibit genuine negotiations.
A tract of land is not just a hunting blind or a favourite fishing hole. Individual
sites such as hunting blinds and fishing holes are but a part of the land that has
provided "cultural security and continuity" to Tsilhqot'in people for better than
two centuries.
A tract of land is intended to describe land over which Indigenous people roamed
on a regular basis; land that ultimately defined and sustained them as a people.
The recognition of the long-standing presence of Tsilhqot'in people in the Claim
Area is a simple, straightforward acknowledgement of an historical fact.28
Turning to matter of reconciliation, he continued:
Given this basic recognition, how are the needs of a modem, rural, Indigenous
people to be met? How can their contemporary needs and interests be balanced
with the needs and interests of the broader society? That is the challenge that lies
29
in the immediate future for Tsilhqot'in people, Canada and British Columbia.
In sum, the crux of Justice Vickers' dilemma was that a declaration of
the Tsilhqot'in people's title would have satisfied Professor Slattery's "principles of recognition" of historical rights, but not the requirement in Slattery's
"principles of reconciliation" that the interests of third parties and of broader
Canadian society be taken into account.3 In Justice Vickers' view, that aspect
of reconciliation had to be attained through genuine negotiations. As I have
said, I think this was the underlying reason for his refusal to issue a declaration of Aboriginal title.
If this conclusion is correct, what are the implications for Aboriginal title
litigation? Will judges always shy away from declarations of title because the
adversarial nature of the Canadian legal system and the limitations of the law
28

29
30

Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at paras. 1376-77. Regarding proof of Aboriginal title, Vickers
J. discussed (at paras. 554-83) the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 220, but found distinguishing differences: "In Marshall; Bernardthe persons
accused both attempted to prove Aboriginal title at specific sites. Here the plaintiff's evidence
is not limited to site specific use and occupation. The evidence ranges over tracts of land. The
plaintiff argues the evidence proves a regular use of these tracts of land as well as use of site
specific locations, sufficient to warrant a declaration of Aboriginal title" (para. 582).
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1at para. 1378.
See Slattery's "preliminary sketch" of these principles in his article, supra note 10 at 283-285,
quoted in Tsilhqot'in Nation,supra note 1 at paras. 1370 and 1372. See also Brian Slattery, "The
Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights" (2007) 38 Supreme Court L. Rev. 595.
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make it impossible for them to achieve the desired goal of reconciliation? In
reflecting on these questions, let us focus on a particularly troublesome aspect
of this problem, namely the existence of third-party interests in areas subject
to Aboriginal title claims.

II Aboriginal Title and Third-Party Interests inTsilhqot'in Nation
Justice Vickers was able to avoid confronting the issue of third-party interests
directly because the plaintiffhad not pleaded any infringement of itsAboriginal
title rights on privately held lands in the claim area,31 and the forest companies
authorized by the province to harvest timber in the claim area had abandoned
their logging plans.32 He nonetheless remarked that the granting of private
interests by British Columbia, including fee simple estates, could not have
extinguished the Tsilhqot'in people's title because the Supreme Court decided
in Delgamuukw that the province has lacked the constitutional authority to
extinguish Aboriginal title since joining Canada in 187 1.1 The province lacks
this authority because Aboriginal title is within exclusive federal jurisdiction
over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians," as provided by s. 91(24)
of the ConstitutionAct, 1867,14 and so the power to extinguish Aboriginal title
is an exclusively federal power. 5
Justice Vickers remarked that the legal effect of provincial grants of private interests on Aboriginal title lands is nonetheless uncertain, and might
have some impact on the application or exercise of Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title rights. Again invoking the need to balance interests, he
wrote that "[r]econciliation of competing interests will be dependent on a
variety of factors, including the nature of the interests, the circumstances surrounding the transfer of the interests, the length of the tenure, and the existing
land use. 3 6 But if the province has lacked the constitutional authority to extinguish Aboriginal title since joining Canada, how could it create interests that
31
32
33
34
35

36

Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 993. Vickers J. relied on Cheslatta CarrierNation v.
British Columbia, [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 10 (B.C.C.A.).
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 39.
Ibid. at paras. 996-97, relying on Delgamuukw, supranote 2 at paras. 172-76.
30 & 31 Viet., c. 3 (U.K.).
Note, however, that since the enactment of s. 35(1) of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, supranote 14,
even Parliament cannot extinguish Aboriginal title without Aboriginal consent: see Van der Peet,
supranote 15 at para. 28; Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R.911 at para. 11. For detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title in Canada: Treaties, Legislation, and
Judicial Discretion" (2001-2002) 33 Ottawa L. Rev. 301.
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supranote 1 at para. 1000. See also HupacasathFirstNation v. British Columbia (Ministerof Forests), [2009] 1 C.N.L.R. 30 (B.C.S.C.) at paras. 216-22. Note that Vickers J. stated in Tsilhqot'inNation at para. 999 that his conclusion that private interests might have
an impact "is consistent with the view of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Chippewas of Sarnia
Bandy. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] 1 C.N.L.R. 56" [Chippewas of Sarnia]. For reasons
why this decision should not apply in British Columbia, see infra note 64.
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might impact on the application or exercise of Aboriginal title rights? Does
this mean that provincial grants of private interests could infringe Aboriginal
title, as long as the infringement fell short of outright extinguishment?
Although Justice Vickers did not address these questions in his discussion of privately held lands, legal answers can nonetheless be found in his
treatment of "Constitutional Issues - Division of Powers," where he dealt
with the application of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.37 Briefly
stated, this doctrine protects the core of exclusive federal jurisdiction under
s. 91 of the ConstitutionAct, 186738 from provincial intrusions that impair or
have an adverse impact on certain federal powers, whether or not Parliament
has exercised its legislative authority in relation to the matter in question. 9 A
long line of Supreme Court of Canada decisions has determined that this doctrine applies to s. 91(24), thus protecting the core of federal jurisdiction over
40
"Indians" and "Lands reserved for the Indians" from provincial intrusion.
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer summarized the constitutional position:
... s. 91(24) protects a core of federal jurisdiction even from provincial laws of
general application, through the operation of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity. That core has been described as matters touching on "Indianness" or
the "core of Indianness".

41

Elaborating on the extent of the core of s. 91(24) jurisdiction, Lamer C.J.
stated:
The core of Indianness encompasses the whole range of aboriginal rights that are
protected by s. 35(1). Those rights include rights in relation to land; that part of
37
38

Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at paras. 1001-49.
Supra note 34.

39

In Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, Binnie and LeBel J.J. modified the
doctrine somewhat to allow for limited provincial intrusion into federal heads of power, as long
as the intrusion is incidental to the exercise of a provincial power and does not impair federal
jurisdiction. See also British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge CanadaInc., [2007] 2
S.C.R. 86; Chatterjeev. Ontario(Attorney General), 2009 SCC 19. Previously, the jurisprudence

seemed to exclude any provincial intrusion into identifiable cores of federal powers: e.g., see Alberta (Attorney General)v. Putnam, [198112 S.C.R. 267; Bell Canadav. Quebec (CSST), [1988]

1 S.C.R. 749; Ordon Estate v. Grail,[1998] 3 S.C.R. 437. For a useful overview of the doctrine,
see Peter Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2007), loose-leaf
40

edition at 15-25 to 15-34.
See especially NaturalParentsv. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 751 at 760761, Laskin C.J.; Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. U.G. WA., [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031; Dick v. The
Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309 [Dick]; Derricksonv. Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285; Paulv. Paul,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 306; R. v. Francis,[1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025; Delgamuukw, supranote 2; Lovelace
v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 at paras. 109-11; Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Ministerof
Small Business, Tourism and Culture), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146; Paul v. British Columbia (Forest
Appeals Commission), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 [Paul];R. v. Morris, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915 [Morris].

For detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, "The Mdtis and the Doctrine of Interjurisdictional Immunity: A Commentary" in Frederica Wilson and Melanie Mallet, eds., Mitis-Crown Relations:
41

Rights, Identity, Jurisdiction,and Governance (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008), 289.
Delgamuukw, supranote 2 at para. 181.
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the core derives from s. 91(24)'s reference to "Lands reserved for the Indians".
But those rights also encompass practices, customs and traditions which are not
tied to land as well; that part of the core can be traced to federal jurisdiction over
"Indians". Provincial governments
are prevented from legislating in relation to
42
both types of aboriginal rights.
The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to apply the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity in R. v. Morris.43 In that case, a treaty right to
hunt was successfully used to defend two members of the Tsartlip Band of the
Saanich Nation against charges of hunting at night with lights, on Vancouver
Island, in violation of British Columbia's Wildlife Act. 4 Although three members of the Court dissented on the ground that night hunting is inherently dangerous and so cannot be a treaty right, the whole Court agreed that provincial
game laws that impair treaty rights cannot apply to the holders of those rights
because treaty rights are within the core of Parliament's s. 91(24) jurisdiction.
In Tsilhqot'in Nation, Justice Vickers applied Delgamuukw and Morris.
He rejected the defendants' argument that the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity protects Aboriginal title only from extinguishment, not infringement, by provincial laws. Referring to Lamer C.J.'s statement in Delgamuukw
that Aboriginal rights and title "may be infringed, both by the federal (e.g.,
Sparrow) and provincial (e.g., C6td) governments, ' 45 he explained:
A provincial law of general application that does not touch upon core Indianness applies to the exercise of Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title. In
my view, the Chief Justice referred to these laws in the foregoing passage from
Delgamuukw. When the Chief Justice stated that provincial laws that infringe
Aboriginal rights must pass the test ofjustification, he was not signalling that the
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity would never apply to a consideration of
s. 35 rights.46
Justice Vickers found confirmation for this interpretation in Morris,
which he said made clear "that provincial laws found to infringe upon Aboriginal treaty rights are constitutionally inapplicable due to the operation of
the doctrine ofinterjurisdictional immunity."47 In this regard, he could not find

42
43
44
45
46

47

Ibid. atpara. 178.
Supra note 40. For commentary, see Kerry Wilkins, "R.v. Morris: A Shot in the Dark and Its
Repercussions" (2008) 7 Indigenous L.J. 1.
S.B.C. 1982, c. 57.
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para. 160, citing R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [Sparrow],
andR. v. Cd, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 [C6tJ].
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1020. See also paras. 1041-44, where Vickers J. explained that activities authorized under the Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157, could infringe
Aboriginal rights other than title if the impact of them did not go to the core of Indianness and
the infringement was justified in accordance with the test in Sparrow, supranote 45.
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1at para. 1021.

Reconciliation and Third-Party Interests: Tsilhqot'in Nation v.British Columbia

17

"any principled reason for treating Aboriginal rights, including title, protected
by s. 35, any differently than Aboriginal treaty rights."4
Justice Vickers' conclusion that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity protects Aboriginal title from provincial infringements that go to the core
of Indianness, as well as from provincial extinguishment, must be correct.
In addition to being supported by the Morris decision, it follows logically
from the combined decisions in DiclP9 and Delgamuukw.50 In Dick, Beetz J.
assumed as a matter offact that hunting was within the core of Indianness of
the Shuswap people, and continued:
On the basis of this assumption and subject to the question of referential incorporation which will be dealt with in the next chapter, it follows that the Wildlife
Act could not apply to the appellant ex proprio vigore, and, in order to preserve

its constitutionality, it would be necessary to read it down to prevent its applying
to appellant in the circumstances of this case.51
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer held that Aboriginal rights, including
title, are also within the core of Indianness. It follows that provincial laws cannot apply of their own force to infringe Aboriginal title in ways that impact on
this core for the same reason that the provincial game laws could not interfere
with Aboriginal hunting in Dick.52
In Dick, Justice Beetz concluded that the relevant provisions of the provincial Wildlife Act,53 while not applicable to the appellant of their own force,
had been referentially incorporated into federal law by s. 88 of the Indian
Act.5 4 Considering s. 88 in Tsilhqot'in Nation, Justice Vickers observed:
Section 88 of the Indian Act makes some provincial laws applicable to Indians
by referential incorporation in the IndianAct. That section provides that the provincial laws of general application "are applicable to and in respect of Indians..."
There is no reference to the second element of s. 91(24), "Lands reserved for
the Indians". 5
48

Ibid. at para. 1022. Vickers J. relied on Van der Peet, supra note 15 at paras. 19-20. See also
Badger,supranote 24; C6t, supranote 45; R.v. Marshall,[1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, [1999] 3 S.C.R.

533.
49
50
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53
54

55

Supra note 40.
Supra note 2.
Dick, supranote 40 at 321.
For discussion and supporting analysis, see McNeil, supra note 40.
R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 433, now R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 488.
R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6, now R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. Section 88, as amended by S.C. 2005, c. 9, s. 151,
provides: "Subject to the terms of any treaty and any other Act of Parliament, all laws of general
application from time to time in force in any province are applicable to and in respect of Indians
in the province, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with this Act or the First
Nations Fiscal and StatisticalManagement Act, or with any order, rule, regulation or law of a
band made under those Acts, and except to the extent that those provincial laws make provision
for any matter for which provision is made by or under those Acts."
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1035.
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Relying principally on British Columbia Court of Appeal decisions,56 Justice
Vickers concluded that s. 88 "is directed only to 'Indians' and cannot be used
to invigorate provincial legislation in its application to Aboriginal title lands."57
Justice Vickers determined that, while "[p]rovincial management of timber and the acquisition, removal and sale of timber by third parties under
the provisions of the ForestAct does not extinguish Aboriginal title," those
provisions nonetheless "go to the core of 'Indianness', or put in contemporary
language, go to the core of Aboriginal title," and so "do not apply to Aboriginal title land under the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity."58 Those provisions go to the core of Indianness because they affect a primary Aboriginal
asset, namely standing timber that is owned by Aboriginal titleholders,59 in
two vital ways: first, by purporting "to manage the asset in such a way as to
render meaningless that Aboriginal right to manage the very land over which
Aboriginal title is held," and second, by authorizing the transfer of that asset
to third parties.6"
But if the provisions of the ForestAct authorizing removal and sale of
timber to third parties do not apply to Aboriginal title lands for constitutional
division-of-powers reasons, provincial grants of timber harvesting rights on
Aboriginal title lands would be ultra vires, and therefore void and of no effect. 6 1 Surely, the same conclusion must apply to any provincial grants of in56

57

58
59

60
61

Derrickson v. Derrickson (1984), 51 B.C.L.R. 42 at 46 (aft'd, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, without
deciding this issue); Paulv.ForestAppeal Commission (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 210 atpara. 76
(rev'd, Paul,supra note 40, on other grounds); Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests), [2002] 4 C.N.L.R. 117 (B.C.C.A.), Lambert JA. at paras. 78-79 (aff'd in part, [2004]
3 S.C.R. 511, without addressing this issue). Vickers J. also relied on Laskin J.'s dissent (on
other grounds) in Cardinalv. Attorney GeneralofAlberta, [1974] S.C.R. 695 at 727, and Lysyk
J.'s extensive analysis in Stoney Creek Indian Bandy. British Columbia, [1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 192
(B.C.S.C.), rev'd on other grounds, [2000] 2 C.N.L.R. 345 (B.C.C.A.).
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1039. He found academic support for this conclusion
in Brian Slattery, "Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 779-781,
and Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title and Section 88 of the Indian Act" (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev.
159. See also Kerry Wilkins, "'Still Crazy AfterAll These Years': Section 88 of the IndianAct at
Fifty" (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458 at 483-497.
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1045. See also OkanaganIndian Band, supranote 27,
per Donald J.A. (dissenting) at para. 53.
See Tsilhqot'in Nation,supra note 1 atparas. 963-81, where Vickers J. discussed the ForestAct,
supranote 46, and concluded it could not apply to Aboriginal title lands because its application is
limited by its terms to Crown timber on Crown lands (this is a matter of statutory interpretation,
distinct from the constitutional issue of interjurisdictional immunity). Like timber on private
lands, timber on Aboriginal title lands is included within the Aboriginal titleholders' "right to
the land itself': ibid. at paras. 974-80, quoting (at para. 976) from Delgamuukw, supra note 2
at para. 140. See also para. 1054, where Vickers J. stated: "The Crown does not have a present
proprietary interest in such [i.e., Aboriginal title] lands."
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1030. See also paras. 1044-49.
Ultravires executive acts are void: see BurrardPowerCo. v. Canada(1910)43 S.C.R. 27, aff'd
[1911] A.C. 87 (PC.); St. Ann s IslandShooting andFishingClub v. Canada, [1950] S.C.R. 211;
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121; and cases cited infra in note 64.
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terests on Aboriginal title lands, including fee simple estates, leaseholds and
mineral rights, as they would all infringe the Aboriginal titleholders' "right
to the exclusive use and possession of land, including the use of natural
resources,"62 in ways that would go to the core of Indianness. So although
Vickers J. observed that the jurisprudence is not clear on "the consequences of
underlying Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, on the various private
interests that exist in the Claim Area, ' 6 the implication from his own analysis
of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is that exclusive federal jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands renders those private interests void.64 Entry
by the grantees would therefore be trespass. 65 Moreover, provincial statutes
of limitation would not prevent the Aboriginal titleholders from recovering
possession that had been wrongfully taken from them by grantees of the provincial Crown because those statutes would likewise be rendered inapplicable
by exclusive federal jurisdiction and interjurisdictional immunity. Addressing
the province's contention that the Limitation Act 6 barred actions based on
unjustified infringements of Aboriginal title, Justice Vickers relied on Delgamuukw and Morris to conclude

62
63
64

65

66

Tsilhqot'in Nation, supranote 1 at para. 978 (see also para. 537), relying on Delgamuukw, supra
note 2 at paras. 111, 117 and 140.
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 999.
In addition to the division-of-powers rationale for this conclusion, cases of long-standing authority have held that a Crown grant of an interest that is inconsistent with an existing interest
is void, at least to the extent of the inconsistency: see Case ofAlton Woods (1600), 1 Co. R.
40b at 44a (K.B.); Alcock v. Cooke (1829), 5 Bing. 340 at 348 (C.P.); In the matter oflslington
Market Bill (1835), 3 Cl. & F. 513 at 515 (H.L.); Bristow v. Cormican (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641
(H.L.); Attorney-Generalforthe Isle of Man v.Mylchreest (1879), 4 App. Cas. 294 (P.C.); City of
Vancouver v. Vancouver Lumber Company, [1911] A.C. 711 at 721 (P.C.); McLean Gold Mines
Ltd. v.Attorney-GeneralforOntario(1925), 58 Ont. L.R. 64 (Ont. C.A.), rev'd on other grounds,
[1927] A.C. 185 (P.C.). Compare Chippewas of Sarnia, supra note 36 at para. 261, where the
Ontario Court ofAppeal held that a Crown patent that conflicts with an existing property right is
valid until set aside by a court. With all due respect, this is inconsistent with the other cases cited
in this note, and so is of questionable authority: for detailed discussion, see McNeil, supranote
35 at 332-342. Moreover, the Crown patent in Chippewas of Sarnia pre-dated Confederation,
and so was not ultra vires for division-of-powers reasons. This aspect of Chippewas of Sarnia
therefore has no application to provincial grants in British Columbia that postdate the province's
entry into Canada in 1871.
See OliverButler's Case (1681), 2 Ventr. 344 at 344 (Ch.), aff'd (1685), 3 Lev. 220 (H.L.) (entry
under a void patent is remediable by trespass); Entick v. Carrington(1765), 19 St. Tr. 1029
(C.P.) (entry under an unlawful Crown warrant is an actionable trespass), approved in Canada
(Combines InvestigationActs, Director ofInvestigationand Research) v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2
S.C.R. 145; Friesenv.Forest ProtectionLtd. (1978), 22 N.B.R. (2d) 146 (N.B.Q.B.) (Minister of
Natural Resources had no statutory authority to authorize acts amounting to trespass on private
lands); Sulisz v.Flin Flon (City), [1979] 3 W.W.R. 728 (Man. Q.B.) (demolition of buildings by
a municipality without lawful authority is an actionable trespass). See also Kent McNeil, "The
Onus of Proof of Aboriginal Title" (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 775, especially at 797-800, also
in EmergingJustice?, supranote 19, 136 at 155-158.
NowR.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266.
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that British Columbia's LimitationAct is constitutionally inapplicable to claims
for unjustified infringement of Aboriginal title. To conclude that the Limitation
Act applies to such a claim would mean that with the passage of time and the application of the provisions of the Act, the Province could effectively extinguish
Aboriginal title. Granting the Province the ability to extinguish Aboriginal title
is contrary to law. Provincial laws that affect Aboriginal title lands go to the core
of Indianness and do not apply to those lands. This is true even though the law
purports to be of general application.67
These conclusions regarding the invalidity of provincial grants of interests on Aboriginal title lands and the inapplicability of provincial statutes of
limitation follow inexorably from Justice Vickers' analysis of the constitutional division-of-powers and the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.
Moreover, we have seen that his conclusions regarding those issues were
mandated by the authority of the Supreme Court of Canada, especially Dick,
Delgamuukw and Morris.6" But as he recognized, the problems arising from
this situation had been created not by judges, but by governments that, "for
successive generations, have failed in the discharge of their constitutional
obligations."69 If, as they should have done, Canada and British Columbia had
negotiated treaties for the surrender of Aboriginal title before the province
granted interests to private parties, the "invidious position" Justice Vickers
found himself in with respect to those interests would never have arisen. This
raises the question to be addressed in the final part of this article, namely, who
is responsible and who should pay for the wrongful taking of Aboriginal title
lands in British Columbia?

67

68
69

Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1314. He distinguished Blueberry River Indian Band
v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 344,
and Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 245, because those cases originated in
the Federal Court, and so provincial statutes of limitation applied as federal law through referential incorporation by the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 39(1). Compare Canada
(Attorney General) v. Lameman, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 372, where the Supreme Court applied the
Alberta Limitation ofActions Act, now the LimitationsAct, S.A. 1996, c.L-15.1, to bar most of
the claims in an action brought in the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench by Aboriginal claimants,
involving, inter alia, surrender of reserve lands and breach of fiduciary obligations (at para. 12,
the Court held nonetheless that "the claim for an accounting for the proceeds of sale" of the land
was not barred, as it "is a continuing claim and not caught by the Limitation of Actions Act").
Although the issue of whether the provincial statute of limitations could apply so as "to trench
upon Aboriginal or treaty rights" had been referred to (but not dealt with) by the Alberta Court
of Appeal in the case (PapaschaseIndian Band No. 136 (Descendantsofi v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2007] 2 C.N.L.R. 283 at para. 145), the Supreme Court did not mention the matter.
On the contrary, the Court stated at para. 9: "We note that no notice of a constitutional question
was given, and that no constitutional challenges lie before the Court."
See text accompanying notes 40-52 supra.
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1368. See text accompanying notes 8-12 supra.
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III The Time for Reconciliation Is Now
In his judgment, Justice Vickers said that "[t]he time to reach an honourable
resolution and reconciliation is with us today."7 As we have seen, he acknowledged the inability of courts to achieve this result, and threw the matter
back to the parties to negotiate an honourable settlement that would take into
account the competing interests of the Aboriginal titleholders, third parties
and the broader Canadian public. At the same time, he pointed to the failures
of "governments at all levels, for successive generations," to discharge "their
constitutional obligations,"71 and chastised Canada and British Columbia
for their "impoverished view of Aboriginal title," which he said "cannot be
allowed to pervade and inhibit genuine negotiations .'7 2 His message to the
federal and provincial governments is clear: negotiate Aboriginal title claims
in an honourable way that, in Brian Slattery's words, involves "the full and
unstinting recognition of the historical reality of aboriginal title, the true scope
and effects of Indigenous dispossession, and the continuing links between an
Indigenous people and its traditional lands," while taking into account other
relevant factors, especially "third party and public interests."73
Justice Vickers deserves credit for his forthright decision and his refusal
to refashion Canadian law to deny the existence of Aboriginal title where it
comes into conflict with other interests, including third-party interests.74 His
judgment shows that, as a matter of law, Aboriginal title ought to prevail over
provincially created interests that are inconsistent with it, but, as a matter
of reconciliation, compromises will have to be reached through honourable
negotiations. So how should third-party interests be dealt with in the negotiations between First Nations and the federal and provincial governments? Even
though these interests are probably invalid for the legal and constitutional
reasons Justice Vickers has outlined, reconciliation would not be achieved if
they were ignored. Worse still, ignoring them could have dire political consequences for the federal and provincial governments, and could push nonAboriginal property holders in British Columbia into open confrontation with
First Nations. And why, one may ask, should those property holders be the
ones to pay the price for the failures of governments to discharge their consti-
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Ibid. at para. 1338. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
Ibid. at para. 1368. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
Ibid. at para. 1376. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
Slattery, supranote 10 at 282, quoted in Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at para. 1367 (italics
removed). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
Compare Mabo v. Queenslandtwo. 2] (1992), 175 C.L.R. 1 (Aust. H.C.), and Chippewas of
Sarnia, supra note 36. For detailed discussion of the ways in which those decisions deviate
from long-standing legal principles, see Kent McNeil, "Racial Discrimination and Unilateral
Extinguishment ofNative Title" (1996) 1A.I.L.R. 181 (also in EmergingJustice?, supranote 19
at 357), and McNeil, supra note 35 at 327-344.
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tutional obligations? Surely, responsibility for these wrongs should rest with
the governments that committed them, not with private citizens who in most
cases are innocent of any personal wrongdoing.75
I would like to offer some suggestions for dealing with this troubling issue of third-party interests on Aboriginal title lands. The starting point would
be acceptance of Justice Vickers' conclusion, which is firmly rooted in Canadian constitutional law, that the creation of such interests by British Columbia could not have extinguished Aboriginal title. Moreover, it follows from
his analysis of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity and of supporting
Supreme Court of Canada decisions that any substantial provincial interference with the Aboriginal titleholders' exclusive rights of possession and use of
their lands would also be unconstitutional, and so even the creation of limited
interests such as logging and mining rights would be invalid. In situations
where resource extraction rights have been wrongfully granted by the province, one solution would be for the province to acknowledge the invalidity of
these rights and pay compensation for having wrongly granted them.76 The
Aboriginal titleholders would be entitled to compensation for loss of use and
damage to their land,77 and the grantees might be entitled to compensation for
losses caused by the invalidation of their interests. Alternatively, the Aboriginal titleholders might agree that, if compensation for past violation of their
rights was paid by the province, they would allow the resource extraction to
continue on their own terms.78 Such an agreement could include an Aboriginal
management role and share of the profits, along with other benefits such as
employment for community members. Thus, resource extraction would not
necessarily cease on Aboriginal title lands, but in future would be subject to
control by the Aboriginal titleholders79 who would benefit rather than suffer
75
76

77
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See McNeil, supranote 17 at 17-18.
Federal contribution to payment of compensation would probably be appropriate, given that the
federal government also shirked its constitutional obligations: see text accompanying note 71
supra.
In Tsilhqot'inNation, supranote 1 at para. 978, Vickers J. stated that infringement of Aboriginal title by the province would give rise to a "remedy in damages." He stated further at para.
1336: "The resources on Aboriginal title land belong to the Tsilhqot'in people and the unjustified removal of these resources would be a matter for appropriate compensation." See also
Delgamuukw, supra note 2 at para. 169. More generally, see Robert Mainville, An Overview of
Aboriginaland Treaty Rights and Compensationfor Their Breach (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2001).
This might or might not require federal involvement, depending on whether it amounted to
an alienation of Aboriginal title: see Kent McNeil, "Self-Government and the Inalienability of
Aboriginal Title" (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 473, especially at 502-508.
This would be part of the decision-making authority that Aboriginal peoples have over their
lands, as recognized by Lamer C.J. in Delgamuukw, supranote 2 at para. 115, and accepted by
Vickers J. in Tsilhqot'in Nation, supranote 1 at para. 507. See also para. 1048, where Vickers J.
stated: "Aboriginal title confers a right to the land itself, and the right to determine how it will be
used."
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from it. Of course, the appropriate solution would depend on the circumstances and would be the product of negotiations.
Resource extraction does not generally entail exclusive possession of
land, and so can coexist with Aboriginal uses if it is done in ways that respect
the environment and the special relationship Aboriginal titleholders have with
their traditional territories. Fee simple and leasehold estates are a different
matter as they do entail exclusive possession and so come into direct conflict
with the exclusive possession rights of Aboriginal titleholders. Moreover, fee
simple holders, in particular, often make substantial "improvements" on the
land,80 including construction of homes and businesses. To dispossess these
people because the province never had the authority to create the interests
they thought they had received would clearly be unjust, with the injustice
increasing with the age of the interests and the value of the improvements. In
the absence of a wrong committed by the landholder, a compromise solution
in this situation would be for legal validity to be conferred on these interests,
perhaps retroactively. In return, the Aboriginal titleholders should receive replacement lands, or compensation for the loss of their Aboriginal title lands,
from the wrongdoers, namely the province that unlawfully granted the interests, and the Canadian government that shirked its constitutional responsibilities by failing to assert its constitutional authority and negotiate treaties.81
Providing these private interests with legal validity would not necessarily
affect constitutional jurisdiction over them. This would depend on the manner
in which legal validity was conferred. One option would be for the Aboriginal
titleholders to execute absolute surrenders of their title to these lands to the
80
81

I have put "improvements" in quotation marks because they might not be regarded as such by
the Aboriginal titleholders.
On these responsibilities, see generally Kent McNeil, "Fiduciary Obligations and Federal
Responsibility for the Aboriginal Peoples" in Emerging Justice?,supra note 19, 309. Providing
replacement lands or compensation is consistent with the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, adopted on September 13, 2007, by the General Assembly,
Resolution 61/295, UN Doc. AIRES/61/295, Art. 28:
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or,
when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for the lands, territories
and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and
which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior
and informed consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take
the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of
monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.
Although Canada voted against the Declaration along with Australia, New Zealand, and the
United States, 144 countries voted in favour. Canada's opposition therefore does not diminish
the value of the Declaration as an international instrument that sets norms and standards for the
treatment of indigenous peoples by United Nations member states, including the tiny minority
that voted against it. See Claire Charters, "Indigenous Peoples and International Law and Policy"
in Benjamin J. Richardson, Shin Imai and Kent McNeil, eds., Indigenous Peoples and the Law:
Comparative and CriticalPerspectives (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009), 161.
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Crown,82 thereby converting them into provincial Crown lands under provincial jurisdiction.83 The province would then be able to confer legal validity on
the private interests by confirming its previously void grants. This would probably be the preferable approach in urban and other heavily populated areas, in
part because it would also preserve the authority of municipal governments.
In other parts of the province where there are fewer privately held lands,
placing these lands under provincial jurisdiction might not be appropriate
because it could create an administratively unworkable patchwork of Aboriginal title lands and privately held lands that would be subject to different
jurisdictions and potentially different laws. In that context, it would be preferable for federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the ConstitutionAct, 186784
to be retained.85 These privately held lands would also be subject to the governmental authority of the Aboriginal titleholders, whether exercised as an
element of their inherent right of self-government over their Aboriginal title
lands, or as an explicit jurisdictional power set out in a modem-day treaty
such as the Nisga'a Final Agreement.86 These arrangements would be more
than fair to the third parties, as their previously invalid interests would be validated and protected. Federal and Aboriginal jurisdiction over their interests

is a constitutional reality these third parties would have to accept,87 as the prov-
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Surrenders to the Crown would be required because Aboriginal title is otherwise inalienable:
see Delgamuukw, supranote 2 at paras. 113 and 129, and discussion in McNeil, supranote 78.
The federal government would have to be a party to these surrenders because it has exclusive
constitutional authority to extinguish Aboriginal title: Delgamuukw at paras. 173-81.
See St. Catherine'sMilling andLumber Co. v. The Queen (1888),14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.).
Supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Long-term leases of Indian reserve lands might provide a model for this as First Nation title to
those lands and federal jurisdiction over them is preserved: e.g., see Musqueam Indian Band v.
Glass, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 633. However, legislation might be required for interests equivalent to
fee simple estates to be held subject to reversionary Aboriginal title: see St. Mary's Indian Band
v. Cranbrook(City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 657.
Initialled 4 August 1998: Nisga 'a FinalAgreement Act, S.C. 2000, c. 7; Nisga 'a FinalAgreement Act, S.B.C. 1999, c. 2. See Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2000] 4
C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.). For detailed discussion, see Kent McNeil, "Judicial Approaches to SelfGovernment since Calder: Searching for Doctrinal Coherence" in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven,
and Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future
of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 129, and "The Inherent Right of SelfGovernment: Emerging Directions for Legal Research" (West Vancouver: National Centre for
First Nations Governance, 2004), online: National Centre for First Nations Governance <http://
fngovernance.org/pdf/KentMcNeilInherent0105.pdf>.
On the extent of Aboriginal jurisdiction and its paramountcy over federal jurisdiction in the
absence of justifiable infringement, see Kent McNeil, "The Jurisdiction of Inherent Right Aboriginal Governments" (West Vancouver: National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2007),
online: National Centre for First Nations Governance <http://fngovernance.org/pdf/Jurisdiction of Inherent Rights.pdf>. Compare Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,Vol. 2, Restructuring the Relationship (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1996), Pt. 1, 213-224.
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ince's lack of jurisdiction over Aboriginal title lands has now been exposed.88
Whatever the legal position, some people may balk at the financial cost of
compensating Aboriginal titleholders for wrongful taking of their lands. But
when privately held lands are expropriated by governments, fair compensation is paid out of the public purse.89 Why should Aboriginal peoples be treated
any differently? If anything, other Canadians should repay Aboriginal peoples
generously for allowing us to be here and for sharing the land and resources
of this wealthy country with us. Moreover, we are all aware of the statistics that place the Aboriginal population at the bottom of the socio-economic
scale on virtually every indicator, from income to life expectancy. 9 The legal
wrongs that Justice Vickers identified in his decision are partly responsible
for this situation. Canadians are collectively responsible for righting these
wrongs as much as possible, and we should bear the cost. As Justice Vickers
said, "[t]he central question is whether Canadians can meet the challenges of
decolonization."91 I believe we can, and that an important step in this direction
is to recompense Aboriginal peoples for the wrongful taking of their lands.
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Tsilhqot'in Nation, supra note 1 at paras. 1001-49. For academic support, see Nigel Bankes,
"Delgamuukw, Division of Powers and Provincial Land and Resource Laws: Some Implications
for Provincial Resource Rights" (1998) 32 U.B.C. L. Rev. 317; Kent McNeil, "Aboriginal Title
and the Division of Powers: Rethinking Federal and Provincial Jurisdiction" (1998) 61 Sask. L.
Rev. 431 (also in EmergingJustice?,supranote 19,249); Kerry Wilkins, "Negative Capacity: of
Provinces and Lands Reserved for the Indians" (2002) 1 Indigenous L.J. 57.
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See generally Eric C.E. Todd, Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada, 2d ed.
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(Toronto: Carswell, 1992); Keith Davies, Law of Compulsory Purchaseand Compensation,5th
ed. (London: Butterworths, 1994).
For judicial confirmation, see R.v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 at para. 59.
Tsilhqot'in Nation, supranote 1 at para. 20.

